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CASENOTES AND COMMENTS
NEED FOR CORROBORATION OF PLAINTIFF IN A
SUIT FOR ALIMONY WITHOUT DIVORCE.
ROEDER V. ROEDER'
Plaintiff-appellee-wife filed suit against defendant-ap-
pellant-husband, alleging abandonment and desertion, and
asking for alimony without divorce. The trial court found
the allegations proven and, by two separate decrees,
awarded the wife alimony. The husband appealed from
both decrees, basing his'appeals on an alleged lack of cor-
roboration of the plaintiff-wife's testimony. The Court of
Appeals affirmed both decrees. Held: Where permanent
alimony without divorce is sought the same requirements as
to proof, including corroboration, are necessary as where
either type of divorce is sought, but where there is no
appearance of collusion, little corroborative evidence is
required to satisfy the statute.
In Maryland a wife may be awarded alimony without
divorce whenever she wotild be entitled either to a divorce
a mensa et thoro or one a vinculo matrizonii' Further it
1 170 Md. 579, 185 Ati. 458 (1936).
2 A statement in the principal case gives the impression that alimony
without divorce may be obtained only for grounds for an a mcna di-
vorce: "In this case the allegations of the bill, in order to support a de-
mand for alimony or separate maintenance, there being no prayer for
divorce, must be such as would entitle the plaintiff to a divorce a inensa
et thoro, if such relief had been prayed .. " 170 Md. 579, 581, 185 Atl. 458,
459. This statement was so summarized in the syllabi by the reporters both
for the Maryland Reports and Atlantic Reporter versions of the case as
to give the impression that the case holds that separate maintenance may
be obtained only for grounds for partial divorce. If this be a correct in-
terpretation of the case then It is inconsistent with a long line of earlier
cases either holding or stating that grounds for either type of divorce
will suffice for alimony without divorce.
Stewart v. Stewart, 105 Md. 297, 66 Atl. 16, (1907), held that while adul-
tery (there ruled to be a ground only for absolute divorce) could not be
used as a ground for partial divorce, yet it could be a ground for alimony
without divorce.
In Staub v. Staub, 170 Md. 202, 183 Ati. 605 (1936), separate mainte-
nance was sought for impotency, which Is a ground only for an a vinculo
divorce. While the Court denied the relief sought on another point, yet
it was taken for granted that impotency could be, in a proper case, a
ground for separate maintenance. The Court expressly said that sepa-
rate maintenance could be secured for any grounds sufficient for either
type of divorce.
In Cohen v. Cohen, 170 Md. 630, 187 Ati. 104 (1936), the grounds alleged
for alimony were grounds for partial divorce, yet the Court said that
grounds for either type of divorce would suffice. While most of the other
Maryland cases on separate maintenance have, so it happens, involved
allegations of grounds for partial divorce, yet numerous statements in
cases both before and after the Roeder case have indicated that alimony
alone may also be obtained for grounds which are grounds only for ab-
solute divorce. A similar careless statement limiting alimony to grounds
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is provided by Article 35, Section 4 of the Code that no
divorce shall be granted upon the testimony of the plaintiff
alone, without corroboration. Thus the question arises
whether, in a suit for alimony alone without divoice, relief
may be granted upon the uncorroborated testimony of the
plaintiff. Such a suit is not a suit for divorce in the strict
sense and yet it must be based on a situation entitling the
plaintiff-wife to a divorce, should she elect to sue for it.
The question is whether the requirement of corroboration
is a mere procedural matter, applying only to nominal
divorce suits, or is a matter of substance, affecting the right
to the divorce, with the result that it impliedly carries over
into suits for alimony alone (separate maintenance). There
is no express mention of the need for corroboration in the
statute governing separate maintenance suits.
The Maryland cases prior to the Roeder case were at
loggerheads on the instant point. In Heinmuller v. Hein-
muller, it is said: "when the whole case precludes . . . any
possibility of collusion, the corroboration need be slight."
In Silverberg v. Silverberg,- it is said:" . . . the wife must
bear . . . the obligation imposed by the statute that her own
testimony will not be sufficient without corroboration." In
Wiegand v. Wiegand,5 it is said: " . . . the rule prescribed
by Art. 35, Sec. 4, Code, it not applicable to a proceeding for
separate maintenance. . . ." In Engelberth v. Engelberth,
it is said: "If Code, Art. 35, Sec. 4, requiring corroboration
of the husband's or wife's testimony is applicable to a pro-
ceeding by a wife for separate maintenance, the corrobora-
tion need be but slight, the nature of the proceeding being
such as to exclude the idea of collusion."
Thus the Roeder case is seen to follow and mingle the
pronouncements in the Heinmuller and Silverberg cases
and, in fact, quotes from the latter case. The Roeder case
differs entirely from the Wiegand case and slightly from the
Engelberth case in that the Engelberth case assumes that
collusion is impossible in any separate maintenance case
whereas the Roeder case purports to find an absence of
for partial divorce only appears in Wiegand v. Wiegand, 155 Md. 643, 648,
142 Atl. 188, 190 (1928) to the effect that ". . . the grounds for relief in
such a proceeding are the same as those required for a divorce a mensa
et thoro."
In general on the question, see Md. Code, Art. 16, See. 14; and Outlaw
v. Outlaw, 118 Md. 498, 84 At. 743 (1912).
o 133 Md. 491, 494, 105 Atl. 745, 746 (1919).
'148 Md. 682, 690, 130 Atl. 325, 328 (1925).
155 Md. 643, 648, 142 Atl. 188, 190 (1928).
* 159 Md. 700, 150 AtI. 271 (1930) (Memo. op.-quotation from syllabus
in Maryland Reports).
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collusion from a subjective examination of the evidence in
the case. ("The evidence in this case shows that there was
no appearance whatsoever of collusion." 7) Thus it assumes
that there might be, in a given case, a collusive suit for
separate maintenance.
If the rationale of the rule of corroboration is solely the
avoidance of collusive divorces then it would seem that the
proper rule should be one which goes even farther than that
of the Engelberth case and to the extreme of the Wiegand
case, viz., to dispense entirely with the need for corrobora-
tion of the plaintiff in separate maintenance suits. For it is
hard to conceive of there ever being a collusive suit for ali-
mony alone without divorce. Collusion implies that both
plaintiff and defendant want the relief sought. In absolute
divorce cases collusion implies a desire for the right to re-
marry. But in a separate maintenance case the defendant
is subjected to monetary liability without gaining the right
to re-marry. Thus it would seem unfortunate to attempt to
resolve the dilemma in terms of a subjective investigation
of the evidence in each case to find out if collusion was pres-
ent. Such a step is, of course, appropriate in suits for abso-
lute divorce, as such, where the prospect of the defendant's
remarrying affords him an incentive for collusion.
But the question next arises whether the sole or prin-
cipal basis of the rule of corroboration is the avoidance of
collusion. Our Court of Appeals has assumed this to be so
both in divorce cases and in separate maintenance cases,
including the Roeder case, where it is said :8 . . . the Act
...was intended principally to prevent collusion... "
But it can be argued that there is a parallel and equally
important basis for the rule of corroboration in divorce
cases which throws more light on the problem of the Roeder
case than does the policy of avoiding collusion. This is the
policy of avoiding perjured or "framed" suits for divorce
and/or alimony where the defendant, far from colluding in
the case, is being imposed on wrongfully and resists com-
pletely. The social problem of the collusive divorce is no
more serious than that of the obtaining of divorces by
perjury against the wishes of the defendants, where no
grounds for divorce exist. On the alimony side there is the
problem of the "gold digger" type of wife who wishes to be
supported in ease without having to live with the husband
who provides the support.
.170 Md. 579, 584, 185 A. 458, 461.
s Ibid.
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It would seem that the rule of corroboration in divorce
cases as well seeks to avoid the plaintiff's imposing a
perjured case on the defendant as to avoid both parties
imposing a collusive case on the court. If this be so, the
rule of corroboration of divorce plaintiffs could be com-
pared to the Statute of Frauds which, by another device--
that of requiring a writing-seeks to avoid "framed" cases.
As further indicating that the rule in divorce cases has this
second policy we should consider that it is found in the
Code in the same Article and Section, and even in the same
sentence and clause, with two other rules of corroboration
where the sole danger sought to be avoided is that of the
perjured or "framed" case. The corroboration statute
provides, in that order, that the plaintiff must be corrobor-
ated in cases of adultery, divorce, and breach of promise of
marriage. Thus the divorce rule is sandwiched between
two others where the sole danger is the trumped up case,
viz., suits for criminal conversation and suits for breach of
promise.9
The gravity of the danger of trumped up suits of the
latter two types is well illustrated by the fact that a few
American states have abolished such causes of action, be-
cause they have been so frequently used as devices of black-
mail.10 That the rule in divorce cases is found grouped
along with these other two rules would seem to indicate
that the Legislature intended the avoidance of "framed"
divorce and alimony cases to be one of the objects of the
Act.
It would seem that cases of alimony without divorce lend
themselves readily to trumped up charges whereby unscrup-
ulous wives may be enabled to secure comfortable support
without performing any marital duties and without losing
their rights in the husband's property. If one may believe
the popular journals, alimony is tending to become a
"racket" in America. If this be so, the strict application
of the rule of corroboration would seem to be one way of
avoiding this.
' Then, too, the corroboration statute immediately adjoins in the Code
another statutory rule of evidence, Md. Code, Art. 35, Sec. 3, which also
seeks to avoid the danger of a trumped up case. This is the statute, some-
times called the "Dead Man Statute", which with certain exceptions ex-
cludes the testimony of interested survivors as to transactions with de-
ceased persons or with persons incompetent to testify because of mental
disability.
10
-A move toward the same end in the Maryland Legislature of 1935
failed of enactment.
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If the rule of corroboration in divorce cases has these two
alternative policies it would seem that the one to emphasize
in the separate maintenance cases is the one involving the
danger that is likely to be present, i. e., a trumped up
charge, rather than the one involving a danger impossible
of being involved, viz., collusion.
Thus it would seem that, rather than to grant relief to
the wife on but slight corroboration, as the Heinmuller,
Engelberth and Roeder cases permit, or to require no cor-
roboration, as does the Wiegand case, the rule should be to
give full and vigorous effect to the statement in the Silver-
berg case, standing alone, and to require corroboration to
the utmost, in view of the fact that one of the two dangers
sought to be avoided by the rule is present in separate main-
tenance cases as much as is ever likely. If the requirement
of corroboration is generally sound it would seem appro-
priate to demand it to the utmost in separate maintenance
cases where collusion is entirely unlikely but where moti-
vated false accusations are very likely. It does not dispose
of the problem to repeat the shibboleth, appropriate enough
for divorce cases as such, that if the nature of the case pre-
cludes collusion the corroboration need be but slight. There
is more to the problem than the danger of collusion.
FURTHER CONCERNING THE DOUBLE LIABILITY
OF BANK STOCKHOLDERS. STOCKHOLDERS
OF PEOPLE'S BANKING CO. V. STERLING
(GHINGHER V. BACHTELL)'
In a case' previously noted in the REVIEW8 the Court of
Appeals of Maryland reversed the trial court and held it
proper to assess "double liability" against bank stock-
holders for debts of the bank incurred prior to their becom-
ing owners of the stock. The stockholders appealed to the
Supreme Court of the United States alleging that the applic-
able statute, as interpreted by the Maryland Court, im-
1 57 S. Ct. 386 (1937). The companion case of Stockholders of Hagers-
town Bank and Trust Co. v. Sterling was decided in the same opinion.
9 Ghingher v. Bachtell, 169 Md. 678, 182 Atl. 558 (sub nom. Ghingher v.
Stockholders of People's Banking Co.) (1936). The companion case in the
Maryland Court of Appeals was Ghingher v. Kausler, 169 Md. 696, 182 Atl.
566 (sub norm. Ghingher v. Stockholders of Hagerstown Bank and Trust
Co.) (1936).8 Note, Double Liability of a bank stockholder for a debt of the bank in-
curred before his ownership of the stock (1936) 1 Md. L. Rev. 95.
